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Abstract
The minmax regret problem for combinatorial optimization under uncertainty can be viewed
as a zero-sum game played between an optimizing player and an adversary, where the optimiz-
ing player selects a solution and the adversary selects costs with the intention of maximizing
the regret of the player. The existing minmax regret model considers only deterministic solu-
tions/strategies, and minmax regret versions of most polynomial solvable problems are NP-hard.
In this paper, we consider a randomized model where the optimizing player selects a probability
distribution (corresponding to a mixed strategy) over solutions and the adversary selects costs
with knowledge of the player’s distribution, but not its realization. We show that under this
randomized model, the minmax regret version of any polynomial solvable combinatorial prob-
lem becomes polynomial solvable. This holds true for both the interval and discrete scenario
representations of uncertainty. Using the randomized model, we show new proofs of existing
approximation algorithms for the deterministic model based on primal-dual approaches. Finally,
we prove that minmax regret problems are NP-hard under general convex uncertainty.
1 Introduction
Many optimization applications involve cost coefficients that are not fully known. When distribu-
tional information on cost coefficients is available (e.g. from historical data or other estimates),
stochastic programming is often an appropriate modeling choice [13, 24]. In other cases, costs may
only be known to be contained in intervals (i.e. each cost has a known lower and upper bound), or
to be a member of a finite set of scenarios, and one is more interested in worst-case performance.
Robust optimization formulations are desirable here as they employ a minmax-type objective and
do not require knowledge of cost distributions [9, 18, 21].
In a general robust optimization problem with cost uncertainty, one must select a set of items
from some feasible solution set, such that item costs are unknown but must be contained in a known
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uncertainty set. Under the well known minmax objective (also referred to as absolute robustness),
the goal is to select a solution that gives the best upper bound on objective cost over all possible
costs from the uncertainty set [25]. That is, one must select the solution that, when item costs
are chosen to maximize the cost of the selected solution, is minimum. Under the minmax regret
objective (sometimes called the robust deviation model), the goal is instead to select the solution
that minimizes the maximum possible regret, defined as the difference between the cost of the
selected solution and the optimal solution [23].
A problem under the minmax regret objective can be viewed as a two stage game. In the first
stage, the optimizing player selects a deterministic solution. In the second stage, an adversary
observes the selected solution and chooses costs from the uncertainty set with the intention of
maximizing the player’s regret. The goal of the optimizing player is thus to select a solution that
least allows the adversary to generate regret. For both interval and discrete scenario representations
of cost uncertainty, the minmax regret versions of most polynomial solvable problems are NP-
hard [4]. A variation on this model, first suggested by Bertsimas et al. [11] for minmax robust
optimization, is to allow the optimizing player to select a probability distribution over solutions
and require the adversary to select costs based only on knowledge of the players distribution, but
not its realization. In this paper, we show that under this randomized model, the minmax regret
version of any polynomial solvable 0-1 integer linear programming problem becomes polynomial
solvable. This holds true for both the interval and discrete scenario representations of uncertainty.
Our crucial observation is that the randomized model is the linear programming relaxation of
the integer program for the deterministic model. This leads to some useful insights. First, the
minmax expected regret in the randomized model is upper bounded by the minmax regret in the
deterministic model. Next, the linear program formulation can be used to create an approximation
algorithm for the deterministic problem. We show that existing approximation algorithms for
deterministic minmax regret problems, which have been proved using combinatorial arguments,
can in fact be derived using primal-dual methods [3, 19]. Our analysis here leads to lower bounds
on randomized minmax regret with respect to the deterministic minmax regret, effectively stating
limits on the power of using randomization.
Given that the randomized model makes the minmax regret problem polynomial solvable for
interval uncertainty and discrete scenario uncertainty, it is natural to ask if polynomial solvability
remains in the presence of slightly more elaborate uncertainty sets. We show that for general convex
uncertainty sets, however, that the mere maximum regret problem (rather than the full minmax
regret problem) is NP-hard. The deterministic and randomized minmax regret problems are at
least as hard as the maximum regret problem, so these problems become NP-hard under general
convex uncertainty.
The paper is structured as follows. In the remainder of this section we review related work;
Section 2 introduces notation and definitions. Section 3 presents the analysis for discrete scenario
uncertainty, with derivations of optimal strategies for the optimizing player and the adversary,
as well as the primal-dual approximation algorithm. Section 4 gives the same results for interval
uncertainty. Section 5 demonstrates NP-hardness of minmax regret problems under general convex
uncertainty. A conclusion is given in Section 6.
1.1 Related Work
One of the first studies of minmax regret from both an algorithmic and complexity perspective was
that of Averbakh [5]. He looked at the minmax regret version of the simple problem of selecting k
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items out of n total items where the cost of each item is uncertain, and the goal is to select the set
of items with minimum total cost. For interval uncertainty, he derived a polynomial time algorithm
based on interchange arguments. He demonstrated that for the discrete scenario representation of
uncertainty, however, the minmax regret problem becomes NP-hard, even for the case of only two
scenarios. It is interesting to contrast these results with the case of general minmax regret linear
programming, which as shown by Averbakh and Lebedev [7], is NP-hard for interval uncertainty
but polynomial solvable for discrete scenario uncertainty.
Apart from the item selection problem, most polynomial solvable minmax regret combinatorial
problems are NP-hard, both for interval and discrete scenario uncertainty. This is true for the
shortest path, minimum spanning tree, assignment, and minimum s-t cut problems [1, 2, 6, 21, 27].
One exception is the minimum cut problem, the minmax regret version of which is polynomial
solvable both for interval and discrete scenario uncertainty [2]. The survey paper of Aissi et al. [4]
provides a comprehensive summary of results related to both minmax and minmax regret combina-
torial problems. For problems that are already NP-complete, most of their minmax regret versions
are Σp2-complete (meaning that they are at the second level of the polynomial hierarchy) [17]. To
solve minmax regret problems in practice, the book by Kasperski reviews standard mixed inte-
ger program (MIP) formulations for both interval and discrete scenario uncertainty [18]. General
approximation algorithms are known for both types of uncertainty. Kasperski and Zielin´ski [19]
proved a general 2-approximation algorithm based on midpoint costs under interval uncertainty,
and Aissi et al. [3] gave a k-approximation algorithm using average costs under discrete scenario
uncertainty, where k is the number of scenarios.
The application of a game theoretic model with mixed strategies to robust optimization problems
was introduced by Bertsimas et al. [11]. They focused on the minmax robust model, and their
analysis was motivated by adversarial models used for online optimization algorithms. As described
by Ben-David et al. [8] (see also Borodin and El-Yaniv [14]), the three types of adversaries are
the oblivious adversary, the adaptive online adversary, and the adaptive offline adversary. The
adaptive offline adversary is the analog of the conventional deterministic minmax regret problem,
while the adaptive online adversary corresponds to our randomized model. The analog of the
oblivious adversary, which we do study, is the model where the adversary first selects costs, and
the optimizing player then selects the solution after viewing these costs.
For the randomized (corresponding to the adaptive online adversary) minmax problem, Bertsi-
mas et al. [11] showed that if it is possible to optimize over both the solution set and the uncertainty
set in polynomial time, then an optimal mixed strategy solution can be calculated in polynomial
time, and that the expected cost under the randomized model is no greater than the cost for the
deterministic model. This holds despite the fact that solving the minmax version of many polyno-
mial solvable problems is NP-hard for the deterministic case [10]. They also gave lower bounds on
the improvement gained from randomization for various uncertainty sets. Our work is similar to
theirs, but we focus on the minmax regret objective instead of the minmax objective.
Another line of research that is related to ours is in security applications, where the adversarial
model is realistically motivated. Korzhyk, et al. [20] considered assignment-type problems where
defensive resources, such as security guards, must be assigned to valued targets. They followed a
Stackelberg model where the defending player has the power to commit to a mixed strategy; the
attacker then observes this mixed strategy (though not the realization) and decides which targets to
attack. They used linear programming formulations along with the Birkhoff-von Neumann theorem
to find polynomial-sized optimal mixed strategies. It is also worth mentioning the work of Bertismas
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et al. on randomized strategies for network interdiction [12].
2 Definitions
We consider a general combinatorial optimization problem where we are given a set of n items
E = {e1, e2, . . . , en} and a set F of feasible subsets of E. Each item e ∈ E has a cost ce ∈ R. Given
the vector c = (c1, . . . , cn), the goal of the optimization problem is to select the feasible subset of
items that minimizes the total cost; we refer to this as the nominal problem:
F ∗(c) := min
T∈F
∑
e∈T
ce. (1)
Let x = (x1, . . . , xn) be a characteristic vector for some set T , so that xe = 1 if e ∈ T and xe = 0
otherwise. Also let X ⊆ {0, 1}n denote the set of all characteristic vectors corresponding to feasible
sets T ∈ F . We assume that X is described in size m (e.g. with m linear inequalities). We can
equivalently write the nominal problem with a linear objective function:
F ∗(c) = min
x∈X
∑
e∈E
cexe. (2)
Throughout the paper, we will use both set notation and characteristic vectors for ease of presen-
tation.
We will review the conventional regret definitions for the deterministic minmax regret frame-
work, and then present the analogous definitions for our randomized model. For some cost vector
c ∈ C, the deterministic cost of a solution T ∈ F is
F (T, c) :=
∑
e∈T
ce. (3)
The regret of a solution T under some cost vector c is the difference between the cost of the solution
and the optimal cost:
R(T, c) := F (T, c) − F ∗(c). (4)
The maximum regret problem for a solution T is
Rmax(T ) := max
c∈C
R(T, c) = max
c∈C
(F (T, c)− F ∗(c)) . (5)
The deterministic minmax regret problem is then
ZD := min
T∈F
Rmax(T ) = min
T∈F
max
c∈C
(F (T, c) − F ∗(c)). (6)
In the remainder of the paper, we will frequently abuse the notation F (·, c), R(·, c) and Rmax(·)
by replacing set arguments with vectors (e.g. F (x, c) in place of F (T, c)), but we will follow the
convention of using capital letters for sets and lowercase letters for vectors.
We now move to the randomized framework, where the optimizing player selects a distribution
over solutions and the adversary selects a distribution over costs. Starting with the optimizing
player, for some set T ∈ F , let yT denote the probability that the optimizing player selects set T .
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Let y = (yT )T∈F be the vector of length |F| specifying the set selection distribution; we will refer
to y simply as a solution. Define the feasible region for y as
Y := {y|y ≥ 0,1⊤y = 1}, (7)
where the notation 0 and 1 indicates a full vector of zeros and ones, respectively. We similarly
define a distribution over costs for the adversary. The set C may in general be infinite, but we
will only consider strategies with finite support; for now we will assume that such strategies are
sufficient. Thus consider a finite set Cf ⊆ C, and for some c ∈ Cf , let wc denote the probability
that the adversary selects costs c. Then let w = (wc)c∈Cf and define the feasible region
W := {w|w ≥ 0,1⊤w = 1}. (8)
The expected regret under y and w is simply
R(y,w) :=
∑
T∈F
∑
c∈Cf
yTwcR(T, c) =
∑
T∈F
∑
c∈Cf
yTwc(F (T, c) − F
∗(c)). (9)
For a given y, the maximum expected regret problem is
Rmax(y) := max
w∈W
∑
c∈Cf
wc
∑
T∈F
yTR(T, c)
= max
c∈Cf
∑
T∈F
yTR(T, c). (10)
The above equality follows using the standard observation used in game theory: the optimization
of w ∈ W is maximization of the function G(y, c) =
∑
T∈F yTR(T, c) over the convex hull of Cf ,
which is equivalent to optimizing over Cf itself. The minmax expected regret problem, which we
refer to as the randomized minmax regret problem, is
ZR := min
y∈Y
Rmax(y) = min
y∈Y
max
c∈C
(∑
T∈F
yT (F (T, c) − F
∗(c))
)
, (11)
where we have replaced Cf with C under the assumption that Cf contains the maximizing cost
vector.
The above minmax expected regret problem is the problem faced by the optimizing player; the
adversary, however, is interested in solving the maxmin expected regret problem, defined as follows.
First, the minimum expected regret problem for a given w is
Rmin(w) := min
y∈Y
∑
T∈F
yT
∑
c∈Cf
wcR(T, c)
= min
T∈F
∑
c∈Cf
wcR(T, c), (12)
where we have once again used the fact that optimizing over the convex hull of the set of solutions
is equivalent to optimizing over the set of solutions. The adversarial randomized maxmin regret
problem is
ZAR := max
w∈W
Rmin(w) = max
w∈W
min
T∈F
∑
c∈Cf
wc(F (T, c) − F
∗(c))
 . (13)
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It is often the case that the minmax value of the game is equal to the maxmin value; that is,
ZR = ZAR. The Minimax Theorem states that this holds for two-person zero-sum games with
a finite number of pure strategies [22]. In the following sections, we will show that this identity
holds for discrete scenario uncertainty and interval uncertainty, following from linear programming
duality.
3 Discrete Scenario Uncertainty
Under discrete scenario uncertainty, we are given a finite set S of |S| = k scenarios. For each S ∈ S,
there exists a cost vector cS = (cSe )e∈E . The adversary’s mixed strategy is a probability distribution
over scenarios, so we are not concerned with complications arising from infinite sets. This section
is divided into three parts; we first determine computation of the optimal randomized strategy for
the optimizing player, followed by computation of the adversary’s optimal strategy. Thereafter,
we use the randomized model to devise a primal-dual approximation scheme for the deterministic
minmax regret problem. We restate and clarify some notation in the context of discrete scenario
uncertainty throughout our development.
3.1 Optimizing Player
We first make some observations regarding the deterministic minmax regret problem that will be
helpful in making comparisons with the randomized model. Under discrete scenario uncertainty,
the deterministic maximum regret problem is
Rmax(T ) = max
S∈S
R(T, cS) = max
S∈S
(
F (T, cS)− F ∗(cS)
)
. (14)
The deterministic minmax regret problem is
ZD = min
T∈F
Rmax(T ) = min
T∈F
max
S∈S
(F (T, cS)− F ∗(cS)). (15)
Lemma 1. The deterministic minmax regret problem with discrete scenario uncertainty is equiva-
lent to the following integer program.
ZD = min z (16)
s.t.
∑
e∈E
cSe xe − F
∗(cS) ≤ z, ∀S ∈ S,
x ∈ X .
Proof. Slightly abusing the notation for maximum regret, we have with vector notation
Rmax(x) = max
S∈S
(∑
e∈E
cSe xe − F
∗(cS)
)
. (17)
The integer program then follows by definition of the maximum.
For the randomized model, recall that the optimizing player’s distribution over solutions is
denoted by y = (yT )T∈F and that Y denotes the set of valid probability distributions. The maximum
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expected regret problem is
Rmax(y) = max
S∈S
∑
T∈F
yTR(T, c
S)
= max
S∈S
(∑
T∈F
yTF (T, c
S)− F ∗(cS)
)
. (18)
We define the expected value of a solution for a distribution y and cost vector cS to simplify
notation:
F (y, cS) :=
∑
T∈F
yTF (T, c
S). (19)
The maximum expected regret problem can then be stated as
Rmax(y) = max
S∈S
(F (y, cS)− F ∗(cS)). (20)
The randomized minmax regret problem is
ZR = min
y∈Y
Rmax(y) = min
y∈Y
max
S∈S
(F (y, cS)− F ∗(cS)). (21)
To solve the randomized minmax regret problem, it is possible to write a linear program anal-
ogous to the above integer program using variables yT . This would, however, have |F| variables,
which may grow exponentially in n. Instead, we note that for the maximum regret expected regret
problem,
Rmax(y) = max
S∈S
(∑
T∈F
yT
∑
e∈T
cSe − F
∗(cS)
)
= max
S∈S
(∑
e∈E
cSe
∑
T∈F :e∈T
yT − F
∗(cS)
)
. (22)
The change in summation order motivates the substitution
pe :=
∑
T∈F :e∈T
yT , e ∈ E. (23)
Let p = (p1, . . . , pn); we will refer to this as the marginal probability vector. The substitution
is a mapping from Y to the convex hull of X . The following is the minmax regret analog of an
observation made by Bertsimas et al. [11].
Lemma 2. For discrete scenario uncertainty, the objective value ZR of the randomized minmax
regret problem (11) is equal to that of the problem
min
p∈CH(X )
max
S∈S
(∑
e∈E
cSe pe − F
∗(cS)
)
, (24)
where CH(X ) denotes the convex hull of X .
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Proof. We use the same arguments presented in [11]. By definition of the substitution (23), the
vector p must lie in the convex hull of X . Carathe´odory’s Theorem [15] states that any p ∈ CH(X )
can be represented by a convex combination of at most n+1 points in X , so there exists a surjective
mapping from Y to CH(X ).
Since we will use the simplified formulation given in Lemma 2 to solve the randomized minmax
regret problem, we address the problem of recovering a vector y given a solution p. In the proof
of the lemma, we have used Carathe´odory’s Theorem, which proves existence of such a mapping,
but not its construction. To this end, we define for the optimizing player a mixed strategy encoding
M = (X,Y ) as a set of deterministic solutions X = {xTi ∈ X , i = 1, . . . , µ} that should be selected
with nonzero probability and the corresponding probabilities Y = {yTi ∈ [0, 1], i = 1, . . . , µ}
that satisfy
∑µ
i=1 yTi = 1. Here µ is the support size of the mixed strategy (i.e. the number of
deterministic solutions with nonzero probablity). For a given vector p, we are interested in solving
the following constraint satisfaction program:
min 0 (25)
s.t.
∑
T∈F :e∈T
yT = pe, ∀e ∈ E,∑
T∈F
yT = 1,
y ≥ 0.
Consider the dual program of (25), which has variables u = (u1, . . . , ue) and w:
max w −
∑
e∈E
peue (26)
s.t. w −
∑
e∈T
ue ≤ 0, ∀T ∈ F , (27)
u,w free.
Recall that the region X is described in size m.
Lemma 3. For any given p ∈ CH(X ), a corresponding mixed strategy encoding M of size poly-
nomial in n can be found via the linear programming formulation (26) - (27). Furthermore, if the
nominal problem F ∗(c) can be solved in time polynomial in n and m, then M can be found in time
polynomial in n and m.
Proof. Notice that while the primal program has an exponential number of variables and a linear
number of constraints, the opposite holds true for the dual. The primal program is bounded since
all objective coefficients are equal to zero, and is feasible due to Carathe´odory’s Theorem. Therefore
the dual program must be feasible and bounded.
To guarantee a polynomial sized solution, note that the separation problem for the constraints
(27) is simply the nominal problem with costs u, so the dual program can be solved via the ellipsoid
method. If the nominal problem can be solved in polynomial time, then the constraints (27) can be
generated in polynomial time, giving a polynomial time solution for the entire dual program (26)
- (27).
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From a practical perspective, a separation oracle for (27) gives an efficient method for performing
row generation with the simplex method. Each row i generated while solving the dual problem
gives a solution xTi ∈ X , and its dual variable is the corresponding probability yTi .
Using Lemma 2, we can now formulate a linear program to solve the randomized minmax regret
problem.
min z (28)
s.t.
∑
e∈E
cSe pe − F
∗(cS) ≤ z, ∀S ∈ S, (29)
p ∈ CH(X ). (30)
This leads to the important result that the randomized minmax regret problem is polynomial
solvable for any polynomial solvable nominal problem. Also, the minmax expected regret is upper
bounded by the minmax regret in the deterministic case.
Theorem 1. For discrete scenario uncertainty, if the nominal problem F ∗(c) can be solved in time
polynomial in n and m, then the corresponding randomized minmax regret problem
miny∈Y maxS∈S(F (y, c
S)− F ∗(cS)) can be solved in time polynomial in n, m, and k.
Proof. Since for all S ∈ S, the value F ∗(cS) is polynomial solvable, each constraint (29) can be
enumerated in polynomial time. If we can optimize over X in polynomial time, then we can separate
over CH(X ) in polynomial time via the result of [16]. This gives the separation oracle for (30).
Corollary 1. For discrete scenario uncertainty, ZR ≤ ZD.
Proof. The program (28) - (30) is the linear programming relaxation of (16).
3.2 Adversary
Moving to the perspective of the adversary under discrete scenario uncertainty, the adversary
must select a mixed strategy over scenarios. The finite number of scenarios naturally requires the
adversary’s distribution to have finite support. Specifically, the adversary selects a distribution
over costs w = (wS)S∈S . The minimum expected regret problem for a given w is
Rmin(w) = min
T∈F
∑
S∈S
wSR(T, c
S)
= min
T∈F
∑
S∈S
wS
(
F (T, cS)− F ∗(cS)
)
. (31)
Recall that W indicates valid probability distributions for w. The adversarial randomized maxmin
regret problem is
ZAR = max
w∈W
Rmin(w) = max
w∈W
min
T∈F
∑
S∈S
wS
(
F (T, cS)− F ∗(cS)
)
. (32)
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From the above definition, we formulate a linear program to solve the adversarial randomized
maxmin regret problem:
max z (33)
s.t.
∑
S∈S
wS(F (T, c
S)− F ∗(cS)) ≥ z, ∀T ∈ F , (34)
w ∈ W. (35)
The linear program has an exponential number of constraints, but the nominal problem gives a
separation oracle.
Theorem 2. For discrete scenario uncertainty, if the nominal problem F ∗(c) can be solved in time
polynomial in n and m, then the corresponding randomized adversarial maxmin regret problem
maxw∈W minT∈F
∑
S∈S wS
(
F (T, cS)− F ∗(cS)
)
can be solved in time polynomial in n, m, and k.
Proof. The separation oracle for (34) is given by the nominal problem. First, notice that F ∗(cS) for
S ∈ S can be computed once at initialization and then stored for easy computation of
∑
S∈S wSF
∗(cS)
for any w. Next, we have
∑
S∈S
wSF (T, c
S) =
∑
S∈S
wS
∑
e∈T
cSe =
∑
e∈T
(∑
S∈S
wSc
S
e
)
. (36)
This means that solving nominal problem with costs d = (d1, . . . , dn) where
de =
∑
S∈S
wSc
S
e (37)
and comparing the solution with z and
∑
S∈S wSF
∗(cS) gives the oracle.
Corollary 2. For discrete scenario uncertainty, ZR = ZAR.
Proof. Using the substitution of the marginal probability vector in (23), it can be verified that
the linear program solved by the adversary (33) - (35) is the dual of the program solved by the
optimizing player (28) - (30). The result holds by strong duality.
3.3 Primal-Dual Approximation
As noted in the above corollary, the linear program solved by the adversary (33) - (35) is the dual
of program solved by the optimizing player (28) - (30). These linear programs correspond to the
relaxation of the deterministic minmax regret problem, and can thus be used to develop a primal-
dual approximation scheme. We will refer to the program solved by the optimizing player as the
primal linear program, and the problem solved by the adversary as the dual linear program.
We rewrite the dual program (33) - (35) as
max z −
∑
S∈S
wSF
∗(cS) (38)
s.t.
∑
S∈S
wSF (T, c
S) ≥ z, ∀T ∈ F , (39)
w ∈ W. (40)
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A simple feasible solution to this program is given first by setting wS = 1/k for each S ∈ S. Using
the standard approach for primal-dual algorithms [26], we start with a sufficiently small value of
z and increase it until a constraint becomes tight. The set corresponding to the tight solution is
then added to the primal solution. The constraint (39) can be written as
∑
S∈S
wSF (T, c
S) =
∑
S∈S
wS
∑
e∈T
cSe =
∑
e∈T
(
1
k
∑
S∈S
cSe
)
. (41)
The first constraint that becomes tight corresponds to the set M that minimizes the mean costs
over all scenarios,
M := argmin
T∈F
∑
e∈T
(
1
k
∑
S∈S
cSe
)
. (42)
The setM , which is complete primal feasible solution, is added to the primal problem. Additionally,
we have a feasible solution to the adversarial (dual) linear program with objective value(
1
k
)∑
S∈S
(∑
e∈M
cSe − F
∗(cS)
)
, (43)
which is a lower bound for the optimal objective value ZR. Using the same observations made in
[3], this gives a k-approximation algorithm for the minmax regret problem. The result given by
the primal-dual framework is stronger than the result proved in [3] since it bounds the value of the
approximate solution within a factor k of the linear programming relaxation value ZR, rather than
the integer program value ZD.
Theorem 3. For discrete scenario uncertainty, the solution to the nominal problem with mean
costs is a k-approximation algorithm for the deterministic minmax regret problem.
Proof. Using the construction above for a lower bound on ZR, we have
ZD
k
≤
(
1
k
)
max
S∈S
(∑
e∈M
cSe − F
∗(cS)
)
≤
(
1
k
)∑
S∈S
(∑
e∈M
cSe − F
∗(cS)
)
≤ ZR. (44)
The first inequality follows by definition of the deterministic minmax regret, the second inequality
by a simple identity between the sum of a set of values and the maximum, and the third inequality
from the linear program.
An interesting corollary is a tight bound on the power of randomization in the minmax regret
problem. For any nominal problem, moving from a deterministic solution to a randomized solution
allows the optimizing player to at most reduce the expected regret by a factor of k.
Corollary 3. For discrete scenario uncertainty,
ZR ≥
ZD
k
. (45)
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The corollary equivalently states that the integrality gap, defined as the largest possible ratio of
the optimal objective value of a program to its optimal linear programming relaxation, is equal to
k. This holds independent of the nominal problem. We construct a tight example for the corollary
using n = k items, where the goal of the problem is simply to select the single item with lowest cost.
For each item, there exists a scenario where the item has cost ce = 1 and all other items have costs
ce = 0. The deterministic minmax regret is equal to 1 for the problem. In the randomized problem,
the optimizing player selects each item with probability 1/k and the adversary selects each scenario
with probability 1/k. The expected regret is equal to the probability that the optimizing player
selects the same item that the adversary assigns unit cost to, which is equal to 1/k.
4 Interval Uncertainty
In this section we assume that cost uncertainty is characterized by interval uncertainty, meaning
that each item cost is independently contained within known lower and upper bounds:
ce ∈ [c
−
e , c
+
e ], ∀e ∈ E. (46)
Define the region
I := {c|ce ∈ [c
−
e , c
+
e ], e ∈ E}. (47)
The set I is in general infinite. Since we wish to use a mixed distribution over I with finite
support, we loosely define the set If to be some subset If ⊂ I with finite cardinality, over which a
probability distribution will be defined. The exact construction of If will become clear during the
analysis, but a sufficient example is the set of cost vectors where costs are set equal to their lower
or upper bounds, If = {c|ce = c
−
e or ce = c
+
e , e ∈ E}.
We proceed in the same way as the last section, studying the optimal policy for the optimizing
player and then the adversary, followed by a primal-dual approximation algorithm for the deter-
ministic problem. We restate notation and definitions throughout.
4.1 Optimizing Player
Under interval uncertainty, we have the deterministic maximum regret problem
Rmax(T ) = max
c∈I
R(T, c) = max
c∈I
(F (T, c)− F ∗(c)) (48)
and the deterministic minmax regret problem
ZD = min
T∈F
Rmax(T ) = min
T∈F
max
c∈I
(F (T, c) − F ∗(c)). (49)
The deterministic minmax regret problem is well studied and can be solved with a mixed integer
program [18]. We use an unconventional formulation, which has an exponential number of con-
straints. We will ultimately show that the randomized minmax regret problem corresponds to the
linear programming relaxation of this formulation.
Lemma 4. For interval uncertainty, the deterministic minmax regret problem (6) is equivalent to
the following integer program.
ZD = min z (50)
s.t.
∑
e∈E\T
c+e xe −
∑
e∈T
c−e (1− xe) ≤ z, ∀T ∈ F ,
x ∈ X .
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Proof. From the maximum regret definition (48) and using vector notation instead of set notation,
Rmax(x) = max
c∈I
(F (x, c) − F ∗(c))
= max
c∈I
(∑
e∈E
cexe −min
T∈F
∑
e∈T
ce
)
= max
T∈F
max
c∈I
(∑
e∈E
cexe −
∑
e∈T
ce
)
= max
T∈F
max
c∈I
 ∑
e∈E\T
cexe −
∑
e∈T
ce(1− xe)

= max
T∈F
 ∑
e∈E\T
c+e xe −
∑
e∈T
c−e (1− xe)
 , (51)
where in the third equality we have used that the expression
∑
e∈E cexe is not a function of T ,
and the last equality follows since xe ∈ {0, 1}. The program is then valid by the definition of the
maximum.
In the randomized model, the maximum expected regret is
Rmax(y) = max
c∈I
∑
T∈F
yTR(T, c)
= max
c∈I
(∑
T∈F
yTF (T, c) − F
∗(c)
)
. (52)
As with the discrete scenario uncertainty case, we define the expected value of a solution for a
distribution y and cost vector c,
F (y, c) :=
∑
T∈F
yTF (T, c), (53)
so the maximum expected regret can be stated as
Rmax(y) = max
c∈I
(F (y, c)− F ∗(c)). (54)
The randomized minmax regret problem is thus
ZR = min
y∈Y
Rmax(y) = min
y∈Y
max
c∈I
(F (y, c) − F ∗(c)). (55)
Starting with analysis of the maximum expected regret problem (52), we use the same substi-
tution that we used in the previous section. Specifically, we let
pe =
∑
U∈F :e∈U
yU , e ∈ E, (56)
and define the marginal probability vector p = (p1, . . . , pn). Slightly abusing notation, we write
Rmax(p) in place of Rmax(y) via this substitution.
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Lemma 5. For interval uncertainty, the maximum expected regret problem (52) is equivalent to
the problem
Rmax(p) = max
T∈F
 ∑
e∈E\T
c+e pe −
∑
e∈T
c−e (1− pe)
 . (57)
Proof. We start with (52) and use the substitution of p. The analysis is nearly identical to the
proof of Lemma 4.
Rmax(y) = max
c∈I
(F (y, c) − F ∗(c))
= max
c∈I
(∑
U∈F
yU
∑
e∈U
ce −min
T∈F
(∑
e∈T
ce
))
= max
c∈I
(∑
e∈E
ce
∑
U∈F :e∈U
yU −min
T∈F
(∑
e∈T
ce
))
= max
c∈I
(∑
e∈E
cepe −min
T∈F
(∑
e∈T
ce
))
. (58)
Now using the notation Rmax(p),
Rmax(p) = max
c∈I
(∑
e∈E
cepe −min
T∈F
(∑
e∈T
ce
))
= max
c∈I
max
T∈F
(∑
e∈E
cepe −
∑
e∈T
ce
)
= max
T∈F
max
c∈I
 ∑
e∈E\T
cepe −
∑
e∈T
ce (1− pe)
 , (59)
where in the first equality we have used that the expression
∑
e∈E cepe is not a function of T ,
and the other equalities follow from rearranging terms. Notice in (59) that pe is simply the total
probability that item e is selected, so for y ∈ Y, we must have pe ∈ [0, 1]. This makes it easy to see
that for a given T ∈ F ,
max
c∈I
 ∑
e∈E\T
cepe −
∑
e∈T
ce (1− pe)
 = ∑
e∈E\T
c+e pe −
∑
e∈T
c−e (1− pe) . (60)
Substituting (60) into (59) then gives an optimization problem with a finite number of feasible
solutions,
Rmax(p) = max
T∈F
 ∑
e∈E\T
c+e pe −
∑
e∈T
c−e (1− pe)
 , (61)
which completes the proof.
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An immediate corollary of Lemma 5 is that we can solve the maximum expected regret problem
for a given y by enumerating all |F| subsets (potentially an exponential number of them) and
choosing the one that maximizes the argument of (61). This allows the entire randomized minmax
regret problem to be restated.
Lemma 6. For interval uncertainty, the objective value ZR of the randomized minmax regret prob-
lem (11) is equal to that of the problem
min
p∈CH(X )
max
T∈F
 ∑
e∈E\T
c+e pe −
∑
e∈T
c−e (1− pe)
 , (62)
where CH(X ) denotes the convex hull of X .
Proof. By the same argument as the proof of Lemma 2.
Using Lemma 6, we can now formulate a linear program to solve the randomized minmax regret
problem:
min z (63)
s.t.
∑
e∈E\T
c+e pe −
∑
e∈T
c−e (1− pe) ≤ z, ∀T ∈ F , (64)
p ∈ CH(X ). (65)
While the above program may have an exponential number of constraints, it can be solved efficiently
via the ellipsoid algorithm if a separation oracle is available for the constraints (64) and (65). This
brings us to our main result.
Theorem 4. For interval uncertainty, if the nominal problem F ∗(c) can be solved in time polyno-
mial in n andm, then the corresponding randomized minmax regret problem miny∈Y maxc∈I(F (y, c)−
F ∗(c)) can be solved in time polynomial in n and m.
Proof. Consider the linear program (63) - (65). The separation oracle for the constraints (65) is
given by the equivalence of optimization and separation [16]. To see the separation oracle for the
constraint (64), we define the item cost vector d = (d1, . . . , dn) where
de = c
−
e + pe(c
+
e − c
−
e ), e ∈ E, (66)
and then solve
zd = min
T∈F
∑
e∈T
de. (67)
Let Td be the set that minimizes the above expression. If
∑
e∈E c
+
e pe − zd ≤ z, then we are
guaranteed feasibility, otherwise the separating hyperplane (64) is generated where T = Td. To see
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the validity of this approach, we have∑
e∈E
c+e pe − zd =
∑
e∈E
c+e pe −min
T∈F
∑
e∈T
de
=
∑
e∈E
c+e pe −min
T∈F
∑
e∈T
(c−e + pe(c
+
e − c
−
e ))
= max
T∈F
(∑
e∈E
c+e pe −
∑
e∈T
(c−e + pe(c
+
e − c
−
e ))
)
= max
T∈F
 ∑
e∈E\T
c+e pe −
∑
e∈T
c−e (1− pe)
 . (68)
The solution to the linear program (63) - (65) is a vector p, which can then be used to find a mixed
strategy y in polynomial time using Lemma 3.
Corollary 4. For interval uncertainty, ZR ≤ ZD.
Proof. This follows simply by noting that the program (63) - (65) is the linear programming relax-
ation of (50).
4.2 Adversary
The set If is necessary for describing the distribution of the adversary. The distribution over costs
is w = (wc)c∈If andW again indicates the set of valid distributions. The minimum expected regret
problem is
Rmin(w) = min
T∈F
∑
c∈If
wcR(T, c)
= min
T∈F
∑
c∈If
wc (F (T, c) − F
∗(c)) . (69)
The adversarial randomized maxmin regret problem is then
ZAR = max
w∈W
Rmin(w) = max
w∈W
min
T∈F
∑
c∈If
wc (F (T, c)− F
∗(c)) . (70)
We can directly formulate a linear program for the adversarial maxmin regret problem, explicitly
writing the constraints for w ∈ W.
max z (71)
s.t.
∑
c∈If
wc
(∑
e∈T
ce − F
∗(c)
)
≥ z, ∀T ∈ F , (72)
∑
c∈If
wc = 1, (73)
wc ≥ 0. (74)
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Since this program has an exponential number of constraints and potentially an exponential number
of variables, we consider its dual. We expect this “dual of the dual” program to be the primal linear
program solved by the optimizing player; this will indeed be the case after some manipulation. The
dual of (71) - (74) is
min β (75)
s.t.
∑
T∈F
αT
(∑
e∈T
ce − F
∗(c)
)
≤ β, ∀c ∈ If , (76)∑
T∈F
αT = 1, (77)
αT ≥ 0. (78)
To simplify, note that for a feasible α = (αT )T∈F , we have
∑
T∈F αTF
∗(c) = F ∗(c). Furthermore,∑
T∈F
αT
∑
e∈T
ce =
∑
e∈E
ce
∑
T∈F :e∈T
αT . (79)
We use the substitution
qe :=
∑
T∈F :e∈T
αT , e ∈ E. (80)
Let q = (q1, . . . , qn). The substitution yields the linear program
min β (81)
s.t.
∑
e∈E
ceqe − F
∗(c) ≤ β, ∀c ∈ If , (82)
q ∈ CH(X ). (83)
This program no longer has an exponential number of variables, and the exponential number of
constraints can be handled via separation, which we describe shortly. First, for some set A ∈ F ,
define the cost vector cA = (cAe )e∈E where
cAe :=
{
c−e , e ∈ A,
c+e , e ∈ E \ A.
(84)
That is, cA is the cost vector where all costs are equal to their upper bound, except for costs
in the set A, which are equal to their lower bound. The theorem below shows that without
loss of generality, we can can consider cost vectors of this form for separation of the constraint
(82). This allows us to define If as the set of all cost vectors {c
A, A ∈ F}. Since this may
still be an exponentially sized set, we define an adversarial mixed strategy encoding L = (C,W )
as a set of costs C = {cAj ∈ If , j = 1, . . . , η} to be selected with corresponding probabilities
W = {w
c
Aj ∈ [0, 1], j = 1, . . . , η} satisfying
∑η
j=1wcAj = 1.
Theorem 5. For interval uncertainty, if the nominal problem F ∗(c) can be solved in time polyno-
mial in n and m, then the corresponding randomized adversarial maxmin regret problem
maxw∈W minT∈F
∑
c∈If
wS (F (T, c) − F
∗(c)) can be solved in time polynomial in n and m.
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Proof. The constraint (82) is simply the maximum regret problem for a given vector q and can be
generated via the nominal problem,
max
c∈If
(∑
e∈E
ceqe − F
∗(c)
)
= max
T∈F
 ∑
e∈E\T
c+e qe −
∑
e∈T
c−e (1− qe)
 , (85)
where we have used the analysis in Lemma 5. This allows us to write the linear program as
min β (86)
s.t.
∑
e∈E\T
c+e qe −
∑
e∈T
c−e (1− qe) ≤ β, ∀T ∈ F , (87)
q ∈ CH(X ). (88)
Note this is precisely the linear program (63) - (65) solved by the optimizing player. This justifies
the assumption of the finite set If : only a polynomial number of separating cost vectors will be
generated, and they will be of the form cA as defined in (84). The adversary is of course interested
in the dual variables of the linear program (86) - (88). Each separating hyperplane generated for
the constraint (87) gives a set T ∈ F for which the adversary adds the cost vector cT to his mixed
strategy; this cost vector has probability wcT in the mixed strategy, given by the corresponding
dual variable.
Corollary 5. For interval uncertainty, ZR = ZAR.
Proof. By strong duality, since the optimizing player solves (63)-(65), which is the dual of the linear
program (71) - (74) for the adversary.
4.3 Primal-Dual Approximation
The primal linear program for the optimizing player is (63)-(65) and the dual linear program for the
adversary is (71) - (74). Using a similar approach to the previous section, we devise a primal-dual
approximation algorithm for the deterministic minmax regret problem.
We rewrite the dual linear program as
max z −
∑
c∈If
wcF
∗(c) (89)
s.t.
∑
c∈If
wc
∑
e∈U
ce ≥ z, ∀U ∈ F , (90)
∑
c∈If
wc = 1, (91)
wc ≥ 0. (92)
We must select a feasible solution for w; we will make the simple choice of setting wc = 1/2 for two
cost vectors. Recall the definition of the cost vector cA. For some set A ∈ F , we have cA = (cAe )e∈E
where
cAe =
{
c−e , e ∈ A,
c+e , e ∈ E \A,
(93)
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Additionally, we define cA = (cAe )e∈E where
cAe =
{
c+e , e ∈ A,
c−e , e ∈ E \A.
(94)
We set wc = 1/2 for c = c
A and c = cA, so the linear program becomes
max z −
1
2
(
F ∗(cA)− F ∗(cA)
)
(95)
s.t.
∑
e∈U
(
c−e + c
+
e
2
)
≥ z, ∀U ∈ F . (96)
Under the primal dual approach, we increase z until one of the constraints becomes tight. The
first tight constraint corresponds to the primal solution M that has minimum total cost under the
midpoint costs:
M := argmin
U∈F
∑
e∈U
(
c−e + c
+
e
2
)
. (97)
This gives the objective value
1
2
(∑
e∈M
(c−e + c
+
e )− F
∗(cA)− F ∗(cA)
)
. (98)
By choosing the set A to be the midpoint cost minimizing set M , we can write the resulting
objective value in terms of the maximum deterministic regret.
Lemma 7. For A =M ,∑
e∈M
(c−e + c
+
e )− F
∗(cA)− F ∗(cA) = Rmax(M). (99)
Proof. The maximum regret for the set M can be expressed as
Rmax(M) =
∑
e∈M
c+e −min
T∈F
 ∑
e∈T∩M
c+e +
∑
e∈T\M
c−e
 . (100)
Also note that
F ∗(cA) = min
T∈F
 ∑
e∈T∩A
c+e +
∑
e∈T\A
c−e
 . (101)
Thus for A =M , we have
Rmax(M) =
∑
e∈M
c+e − F
∗(cA). (102)
It is left to show that F ∗(cM ) =
∑
e∈M c
−
e . This, however, immediately follows with a simple
argument. Since the set M is minimum for midpoint costs, it must also be minimum for costs cM
(i.e., the costs where ce = c
−
e for all e ∈M and ce = c
+
e for all e ∈ E \M).
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This gives a new proof that solving the nominal problem with midpoint costs gives a 2-
approximation to the deterministic minmax regret problem. Once again, the result here is stronger
than the result of [19] since it states that the value of the approximate solution is within a factor
2 of ZR rather than just ZD.
Theorem 6. For interval uncertainty, the solution to the nominal problem with midpoint costs is
a 2-approximation algorithm for the deterministic minmax regret problem.
Proof. The linear program listed above is the dual of the problem solved by the optimizing player
in the randomized framework. By weak duality, any feasible solution to the above program gives a
lower bound on the value of the game in the randomized framework, ZR. The construction described
above using costs cA and cA gives a feasible solution to the program, and Lemma 7 allows us to
express the resulting objective value in terms of the maximum deterministic regret for a solution
set M using A =M . Specifically,
ZD
2
≤
Rmax(M)
2
≤ ZR ≤ ZD, (103)
where the first inequality follows from the definition of the deterministic minmax regret problem,
the second inequality follows using Lemma 7 with the feasible linear programming solution, and
the third inequality follows from Theorem 4.
The potential gain from using randomization under interval uncertainty is not as significant as
with discrete scenario uncertainty.
Corollary 6. For interval uncertainty,
ZR ≥
ZD
2
. (104)
Independently of the nominal problem, the integrality gap for the minmax regret problem is equal
to 2. A tight example for the corollary is easily constructed. Consider a problem with two items
E = {e1, e2} where the optimizing player must choose one item. Let (c
+
e , c
−
e ) = (0, 1) for both
items e = e1, e2. It can be verified that ZD = 1 and ZR = 1/2.
5 General Uncertainty Sets
In this section, we show that if the uncertainty set C is allowed to be a general nonnegative con-
vex set and the nominal problem is polynomial solvable, the maximum expected regret problem
becomes NP-hard. Note that the deterministic maximum regret problem is a special case of the
maximum expected regret problem. The result of this section thus implies that both randomized
and deterministic minmax regret problems are NP-hard under general convex uncertainty, even if
the nominal problem is polynomial solvable.
We restate the maximum expected regret problem for general uncertainty sets. For a given
marginal probability vector p, the maximum expected regret problem is, starting with the first line
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of (59),
Rmax(p) = max
c∈C
(∑
e∈E
cepe − F
∗(c)
)
= max
c∈C
(∑
e∈E
cepe −min
x∈X
∑
e∈E
cexe
)
= max
c∈C
max
x∈X
(∑
e∈E
ce(pe − xe)
)
. (105)
Negating the objective function, the maximum expected regret problem is equivalent to
−Rmax(p) = min
c∈C
min
x∈X
∑
e∈E
ce(xe − pe), (106)
for a given p ∈ CH(X ).
Before we examine the complexity of (106), we consider the following problem, which we refer
to as the bilinear combinatorial problem:
min
c∈C
min
x∈X
∑
e∈E
cexe. (107)
We demonstrate the hardness of this problem via a reduction from the Hamiltonian path problem;
the proof is similar to the standard proof for showing that the intersection of three matroids is
NP-hard.
Lemma 8. For polynomial solvable nominal problems F ∗(c) = minx∈X
∑
e∈E cexe and nonnegative
convex uncertainty sets C, the bilinear combinatorial problem minc∈Cminx∈X
∑
e∈E cexe is NP-hard.
Proof. Recall that the directed Hamiltonian path problem asks the following: given a directed
graph G = (V,E) with a designated source node s and terminal node t, does there exist a path
starting at s and ending at t that visits each node exactly once? For a given instance of the directed
Hamiltonian path problem, we construct an instance of the bilinear combinatorial problem such
that it has an optimal objective value of zero if an only if the graph contains a valid Hamiltonian
path.
We construct the set C to indicate the selection of edges such that each vertex has exactly one
incoming edge (except for vertex s) and one outgoing edge (except for vertex t). Specifically, we
say that an edge e is selected if its cost ce is equal to zero, otherwise we refer to it as blocked.
The notation δ+(v) (respectively δ−(v)) indicates the set of outgoing (incoming) edges for vertex
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v. The constraints for the set C are∑
e∈δ−(v)
ce = |δ
−(v)| − 1, v ∈ V \ {s},
∑
e∈δ−(s)
ce = |δ
−(s)|,
∑
e∈δ+(v)
ce = |δ
+(v)| − 1, v ∈ V \ {t},
∑
e∈δ+(t)
ce = |δ
+(t)|,
0 ≤ ce ≤ 1, e ∈ E. (108)
Note that for a given vertex, if one if its incoming edges is selected (ce = 0), then all the remaining
incoming edges must be blocked (ce = 1); the same holds for outgoing edges.
Define X to indicate the set of all feasible spanning trees for G, so that minx∈X
∑
e∈E cexe is
the minimum spanning tree problem. For an optimal solution x∗ = (x∗1, . . . , x
∗
n) to the bilinear
combinatorial problem giving zero objective value, the set {e|x∗e = 0, e ∈ E} indicates a valid
Hamiltonian path, as the construction of C indicates that all vertices have one selected incoming
and outgoing edge (except for s and t), and the spanning tree ensures that no cycles are present.
Finally, we have that the construction of the set C can be done in polynomial time.
Theorem 7. For polynomial solvable nominal problems F ∗(c) = minx∈X
∑
e∈E cexe and nonnega-
tive convex uncertainty sets C, the maximum expected regret problem maxc∈C
(∑
e∈E cepe − F
∗(c)
)
where p ∈ CH(X ) is NP-hard.
Proof. We modify the reduction used for Lemma 8 to account for the presence of some p ∈ CH(X )
in the objective function of the maximum expected regret problem, which is now
min
c∈C
min
x∈X
∑
e∈E
ce(xe − pe). (109)
Again let X indicate the set of all feasible spanning trees for the directed graph G = (V,E) and
let p ∈ X be a valid spanning tree. We construct a new graph over the same set of vertices by
taking G and duplicating |V | − 1 edges. For each edge given by the spanning tree p, we choose a
corresponding edge in G (note that there may be more than one option if both edges (vi, vj) and
(vj , vi) are present, for example) and duplicate it. Let this new graph be denoted by G
′ = (V,E′),
and let the set of all spanning trees over the new graph be indicated by X ′. Let p˜ ∈ X ′ indicate the
set of edges that were constructed via duplication (i.e. the edges E′ \E), which is a valid spanning
tree for G′. We finally construct the set C′ using the inequalities in (108) but over E′ instead of E.
Now consider the modified maximum expected regret problem
min
c∈C′
min
x∈X ′
∑
e∈E′
ce(xe − p˜e) = min
c∈C′
min
x∈X ′
∑
e∈E
cexe +
∑
e∈E′\E
ce(xe − 1)
 . (110)
It can be seen that the modified problem has an objective value equal to −(|V | − 1) if and only
if G has a Hamiltonian path. This corresponds to the first sum in objective function being equal
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to zero, and the second sum being equal to −(|V | − 1). As before, for an optimal solution x∗ =
(x∗1, . . . , x
∗
n+|V |−1) to the modified problem, the set {e|x
∗
e = 0, e ∈ E
′} gives a Hamiltonian path
that is valid for both G′ and G. Notice that all of the duplicated edges e ∈ E′ \E must be blocked
(ce = 1) and not selected by the minimum spanning tree (xe = 0) for the objective value to be
equal to −(|V | − 1). To finish the proof, we observe that the construction of C′ and G′ can be
accomplished in polynomial time.
6 Conclusion
We have shown that for both the interval and discrete scenario representations of uncertainty, the
randomized minmax regret version of any polynomial solvable combinatorial problem is polynomial
solvable. Furthermore, the maximum expected regret in the randomized model is upper bounded
by the maximum regret of the deterministic model. These results, including the fact that there
always exists a polynomial-sized optimal solution for randomized minmax regret, are at first glance
somewhat surprising. Intuitively, the polynomial solvability of the randomized model results from
the fact that a linear program must be solved instead of the integer program or mixed integer
program (which is required for the deterministic model). The improvement in performance holds
because the adversary has less power in the randomized model than the deterministic model.
For many applications that are not adversarial in nature, the randomized minmax regret criteria
is likely a more appropriate model than the deterministic version. In particular, the deterministic
solution may be overly conservative since costs are not truly chosen in an adversarial fashion in
response to the selected solution. On the other hand, one must be willing to tolerate higher variance
if randomization is used.
Our results on lower bounds for randomized minmax regret in relation to deterministic minmax
regret, specifically Corollary 3 and 6, have important implications for approximating deterministic
minmax regret problems. In Kasperski [18], it is posed as an open problem whether or not there
exist approximation algorithms for interval uncertainty that, for some specific nominal problems,
achieve an approximation ratio better than 2. In some sense, we have answered this question in the
negative. Corollary 6 indicates that the integrality gap for the minmax regret problem is equal to 2,
and it is easy to create instances of nearly all nominal problems that achieve this gap. The same can
be argued for the integrality gap of k under discrete scenario uncertainty. Integrality gaps bound
the best possible performance that can be obtained from approximation algorithms based on linear
programming relaxations, which includes many approximation techniques [26]. Nonetheless, an
important shortcoming of our primal-dual algorithms is that they do not use optimal dual solutions.
It may be possible to design algorithms that perform better on specific problem instances by using
optimal dual solutions. Under discrete scenario uncertainty, for instance, solving the nominal
problem with costs averaged by dual variable weights, rather than averaged uniformly, may give
improved performance.
An important future step with randomized minmax regret research is to develop approximation
algorithms (now in the randomized model) for dealing with nominal problems that are already NP-
complete. This problem is non-trivial: an algorithm with an approximation factor α for a nominal
problem does not immediately yield an algorithm to approximate the randomized minmax regret
problem with a factor α. Another interesting topic to study from an experimental perspective is a
hybrid approach that employs both deterministic and randomized minmax regret. For example, one
could find a solution that minimizes the maximum expected regret, subject to the maximum regret
being no greater than some constant. The algorithm for this problem can be easily constructed by
23
combining our results with existing work, but may no longer be polynomial solvable.
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